To little surprise throughout the aviation industry, Airbus announced its plans to end A380 production in 2021.
Last winter, with the model on life support, Airbus made an 11th-hour sale to Emirates — the A380’s foremost customer, with 109 Superjumbos in its fleet — that kept the production line alive. However, with Emirates scaling back its most recent order, and few orders from elsewhere, there had been rumors that the end was near. Airbus made the decision that it was no longer sustainable to produce the aircraft beyond the fulfillment of this order, which will be completed in 2021.
Given that the A380 will continue to operate likely into the 2030s and possibly even the 2040s, its not as if its demise will begin in 2021. However, it is evident that what was once seen as a potentially revolutionary aircraft — and it is, in a number of ways — will likely deliver far less than hoped, no pun intended.
Opposing Endgames
In order to understand why Airbus made this major decision, it’s important to understand how it got to this point.
When the A380 program was announced in the 1990s, Airbus’ goal was to produce an aircraft larger than the 747 that also boasted lower operating costs.
Industry experts figured that the launch of this program would make Boeing improve the 747-400 which — while the best-selling version of the 747 — was launched in the 1980s, meaning that it didn’t have the latest and best technology. Boeing’s answer was the 747-8, a newer, sleeker version of the 747 with, among other things, a longer fuselage, more efficient engines, and raked wingtips. While the freight version, the 747-8F, continues to be successful, the passenger version, dubbed the 747-8i (“i” for intercontinental), was not well-received by airlines, which were starting to move towards smaller, more fuel-efficient aircraft. Even an efficient quad jet is, generally speaking, less efficient than a twin jet.
Some derided Boeing’s seemingly half-hearted attempt at answering to the A380. Others claimed that Boeing’s lack of 747-8 passenger jet sales versus its projections made it a failure. A third angle: Boeing’s focus was elsewhere, producing an aircraft that would enable airlines to operate long-haul routes. This project became the 787 Dreamliner, a revolutionary aircraft with mood lighting, improved cabin comfort, and incredible fuel efficiency.
Airbus’ counter play to the 787, meanwhile, became the A350 (Airbus initially sought to build a longer-range version of the A330-200, called the A330-200Lite, but airlines balked, so it launched a new program). And while Airbus has been successful with the A350, it still lags far behind 787 in orders and deliveries (though it is worth noting that the latter was launched several years earlier). Boeing seems to be winning the long-haul war, at least for now.
Opposing Strategies: Hub-and-Spoke vs. Point-to-Point
In short, the two manufacturers possess different strategies. Airbus went all-in on the “hub and spoke” model, while Boeing focused on “point-to-point” routes.
Seeing increasing congestion at many of the world’s largest airports, Airbus figured that increasing capacity would free up “slots” to operate other aircraft. For example, British Airways could go from operating three daily 747s to two daily A380s on its London Heathrow to Los Angeles service. This would free up a “slot” to start a new route to another location.
Moreover, Airbus’ conviction that airlines would continue to use the “hub-and-spoke” model — meaning that passengers generally use large hubs to get from place to place — made it focus on “trunk” (extremely high-demand) routes with the development of the A380. For example, someone traveling from, say, Memphis, Tennessee, to Chengdu, China, would have to fly from Memphis to New York JFK, New York JFK to Beijing (the trunk route), and Beijing to Chengdu. This is a hypothetical example, of course, but it illustrates that, in this model, passengers — particularly those traveling between smaller cities — are routed through larger population centers en route to their destination.
Boeing, meanwhile, bet on airlines wanting to operate more “point-to-point” routes — meaning that the passenger above would be able to fly direct from Memphis to Chengdu. Up until the 787 was introduced, the only planes with the range to fly that far were aircraft like Airbus’ A340 and Boeing’s 747 and 777. The 767, which has similar capacity to the 787, doesn’t have anywhere near the range to operate these long routes, and there aren’t enough people traveling between Memphis and Chengdu to fill a 777 or 747. The solution: a smaller aircraft with the same range capabilities as its larger counterparts and improved fuel efficiency.
This doesn’t mean that routes between every city pair are now viable — I hardly expect the 787 to allow Hartford, Connecticut, to become connected with Osaka, Japan, for example. However, it extends the possibilities far beyond what they once were.
Strategic Effectiveness
On the surface, Airbus’ strategy appears reasonable. After all, larger aircraft allow airlines to operate fewer flights. Not only does this decrease per-passenger labor costs — more seats per plane means less flights, and it also means less ground staff, pilots, and (to an extent) cabin crew required for the same number of passengers — but it also frees up “slots” at busy, capacity-constrained airports, enabling carriers to operate more routes. And, in terms of profitability, it’s likely that Airbus expected these long thin routes to be money-losers.
However, airlines are eager to cater to customer demand — and customers demand options. As such, in the airline world, frequency — not efficiency — is king. With this in mind, and with a number of new routes being opened thanks to the 787, Boeing seems to have picked the preferable strategy as far as long-haul flying goes. And while American carriers are the biggest betters on frequency over size — no doubt driven by many Americans’ expectation of being able to get wherever, whenever, and with as few stops possible — it is particularly telling that no carrier from North America, South America, or Africa placed an A380 order; the 747-400, meanwhile, has served carriers of all six of the Earth’s inhabited continents.
Another issue: the A380 was too big for most airports’ existing infrastructures. In fact, one of the likely reasons that British Airways doesn’t fly the A380 from London Heathrow to New York JFK — in addition to its obsession with frequency on its flagship route — is that Terminal 7 (BA’s terminal at JFK) — does not have “A380-capable gates.” Most, if not all airports regularly-serviced by the A380, have had to update their taxiways and gate areas to welcome the behemoth.
My Own Thoughts
Initially, I was not a huge fan of the A380. Admittedly, the reasons had little to do with the function of the aircraft, and much more to do with my own biases.
In my mind, its aesthetics left a lot to be desired, leading to my dubbing it the “Whalebus,” which I still use mainly because I think it’s funny. The massive wings provide superior lift, but they also appeared too large to be natural. For reference, the A380’s length is 239 feet, its wingspan is 261 feet, its wing area is 9,100 square feet, and its wing sweep (the angle at which the wings are attached to the fuselage) is 33.5 degrees, giving it a rather “blocky” appearance. The 747-400, meanwhile, measures 231 feet in length, has a wing area of 5,650 square feet, a wingspan of 211.5 feet, and a wing sweep of 37.5 degrees. All told, particularly with its two full decks, I thought the A380 looked like a whale. Looking at the aircraft, I felt that it lacked character, and I didn’t think its comfort could counterbalance its aesthetics shortcomings.
Additionally, I wasn’t fond of the 747 being usurped as the largest passenger aircraft. In fact, the first commercial plane I became aware of was the Boeing 747-400: my “first (aviation) love,” as one might say. And while I have nothing against Airbus aircraft — I counted the A330 among my favorites at the time — I wasn’t eager to have Airbus eating Boeing’s lunch.
What changed my opinion? Two flights on the A380 raised its esteem.
My first A380 flight, a China Southern Airlines trip from Beijing to Guangzhou, was a memorable experience. I was impressed by how quiet the plane was — the spool up and takeoff thrust levels were barely audible from where I was seated at the back of the upper deck. I also appreciated the space between the window seat and the window itself due to the curvature of the fuselage. This allows for an extra storage cabin — too small for a roll-aboard, but large enough for a backpack. The in-flight entertainment (IFE) wasn’t half-bad, either, and I think countless rounds of Tetris made the two-and-a-half hour trip go by quickly.
The second was a British Airways flight from Boston to London Heathrow. Again, I was seated in an upper deck window seat, and, again, the experience was positive: a quiet, comfortable flight, excellent IFE, and plenty of space. I still had more fun flying on the 747 for the return leg, but that was largely due to sentimental reasons — the A380’s comfort and modernity stood out once again.
Is it too late to fly on an A380?
Absolutely not!
For all of its issues with the aircraft, Emirates will continue to operating the A380 for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the A380 remains in high esteem within carriers like British Airways and Lufthansa, and neither have plans to retire the A380s from their fleets anytime soon.
Based on my own experiences, I highly recommend the A380 if it’s an option. You can find a full list of A380 destinations worldwide here.
The Fallout
Predictably, both Airbus and Boeing are trying to spin this story to their respective advantages.
Boeing backers will point out the comparative failure of the A380 versus its flagship 747. They will state that the 747’s 1,500+ deliveries cement its legacy as the premier four-engine wide body. Airbus, meanwhile, will produce a maximum of 281 A380s when the program goes off line — less than 20% of the total 747 deliveries Boeing has made to date. And while Boeing’s 747-8i flopped compared to its passenger predecessors, Boeing is doing well with the 747-8F, while Airbus failed to deliver a single A380 freighter after FedEx and UPS cancelled their orders.
Airbus backers, meanwhile, will claim that Emirates’ decision to convert its remaining A380 orders to A330neos and A350s — and, as a result, stop going forward with its tentative Boeing 787-10 order — is an Airbus win. This is not unexpected, though: when airlines go to a manufacturer to cancel an order for a particular aircraft, they generally either convert the current order to other aircraft or have to pay significant cancellation fees. It is understandable that Emirates would choose the former.
And, of course, there are some positive aspects for Airbus, including the belief that this will help it in pending litigation before the World Trade Organization (WTO).
I recognize that I am biased to Boeing in this situation, but I can’t see the Airbus spin gaining much traction. Merited or not, I feel that the multi-faceted claims of “failure” — the lack of orders, the airport infrastructure difficulties, and the Rolls-Royce engine issues — are much more likely to stick.
Moreover, Airbus sunk tens of billions of dollars into researching, developing, and manufacturing these aircraft. As far as the A380 program is concerned, it seems likely that the manufacturer will have lost a significant sum of money when all is said and done, even if the A350’s financial prospects appear much better than the aircraft it replaces as Airbus’ flagship.
It’s a shame that it had to end this way. However, instead of a simultaneous double-whammy of production cancellation and withdrawal from fleets, passengers still have ample time to try an aircraft — even if said to be “more loved by passengers than operators” — that, for better or worse, will leave an indelible mark on aviation history.
